" .

             However no matter where the boundary line between copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements of computer programs was to be drawn, for Keeton J. it was clearly the role of the courts to draw the ultimate line. Congress, he explianed had "mandated that courts use an evaluative standard in determining this boundary line that is, a standard that distinguishes idea from expression and requires that a court, in applying this distinction, be sensitive to the object and policy of copyright law as manifested by Congress.".

             In summary Keeton J was saying:.

             i) the purpose of the statute was to enhance public welfare by granting a copyright monoply; .

             ii) that this purpose informed the determination of what was copyrightable and; .

             iii) that it was for the courts after evaluating all the factors to make the final decision on copyrightable subject matter.

             e) Idea v Expression; Expressions not Copyrightable.

             Keeton J then returned to the statute. He said that the statute protected expressive elements of computer programs but not ideas, processes or methods embodied in the program; the idea-expression distinction. Keeton J held that the idea-expression dichotomy was relevant to the issue of copyrightability of computer programs, but qualified this saying that not all expression was copyrightable. There were four types of expression he explained that were not copyrightable:.

             The expression of an idea is copyrightable only if it is original that is, if the expression originated with the author. s 102(a). Even then the expression of the idea is not copyrightable if the expression does no more than embody elements of the idea that are functional in the utilitarian sense. s 102(b). The third concept is "obviousness." When a particular expression goes no farther than the obvious, it is inseparable from the idea itself. Protecting an expression of this limited kind would effectively amount to protection of the idea, a result inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.