Examples of "works of authorship" he explained were listed in 17 U.S.C. s 102 (a) to include literary works. Keeton J went on to say that after amendments to the Copyright Act 1976, in 198O, computer programs were commonly regarded as coming within the definition of "literary work" in 17 U.S.C s 101. However citing s 102 (b) Keeton J made it clear that copyright protection for an original work of authorship did not extend to any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery.".

             d) The Object and Policy of Copyright Law.

             In developing the meaning of the statute Judge Keeton continued on to assess the object and policy of the Copyright Act 1976. He rehearsed the view that copyright monopolies are not granted for the purpose of rewarding authors, but rather to to serve the public welfare by encouraging authors (broadly defined) to generate new ideas and disclose them to the public, being free to do so in any uniquely expressed way they may choose: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985). .

             Keeton J explained that "in construing the relevant statutory mandates, the court must be faithful to the statutory language and mindful of both the ultimate goal of copyright law the advancement of public welfare and Congress' chosen method of achieving this goal private reward to the individual author." Courts he explained "should not draw the line between copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements of computer programs in such a way as to harm the public welfare" however "drawing the line too liberally in favor of copyright protection would bestow strong monopolies over specific applications upon the first to write programs performing those applications and would thereby inhibit other creators from developing improved products" while "drawing the line too conservatively would allow programmer's efforts to be copied easily, thus discouraging the creation of all but modest incremental advances.