They recognized their comparative advantage in guerrilla warfare and their strategy enabled them to transition to conventional based on the circumstances. (Handel, 100) When faced with significant losses, the communist leadership proved flexible enough to recall their conventional forces. They left VC guerrilla forces to continue the fight and bear the brunt of casualties for the North Vietnamese war effort. (Bergerud, 300) When necessary, front units in the South could be replenished with regular soldiers from the North. (Bergerud, 309) Their ability to constantly reassess and adapt during the conflict enabled them to prosecute the protracted conflict they believed could last as long as fifty years and would eventually defeat the US and GVN. (Pike, 220) .

             While the above examples highlight how well the North Vietnamese leadership adapted their strategy during the war, their approach also ensured the US Army remained committed to conducting conventional operations which hindered pacification efforts and alienated the South Vietnamese. The first major conventional operation with US forces occurred in November 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley. During this battle, the US Army 1st Cavalry engaged a regimental sized North Vietnamese force. The ensuing battle led to 1,200 communist and 200 US losses and was considered a major victory by US Army leadership. (Krepinevich, 169) .

             Before the Battle of Ia Drang Valley, VC forces often combined to conduct successful attacks on ARVN units. These successful conventional operations even resulted in the capture of a provincial capital and the destruction of an ARVN battalion and the force sent to relieve it. (Krepinevich, 152) Successful VC conventional operations further confirmed General Westmoreland's desire to "seek out and destroy the enemy's main-force units, the VC/PAVN battalions and regiments. (Krepinevich, 142) Other indicators such as rising guerrilla attacks and increased VC battalion operations added to the belief that the North Vietnamese communists intended to transition to phase 3 (conventional operations) of insurgency warfare.