Warfare in the Vietnam War

Each stage of the armed struggle entails a transition between guerrilla and conventional operations. The two kinds of Dau Tranh, political and armed, worked together during the war to ensure North Vietnamese and VC victory. (Pike, 224-225) .

             As the Vietnam War progressed, People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) generals led by General Giap reassessed and adapted their strategy to fit the circumstances. This enabled the VC revolutionaries, supported by North Vietnamese regular forces, to achieve success without ever defeating US forces on the battlefield. For instance, the Tet Offensive in 1968 represented an operational failure in Stage Three of the Dau Tranh strategy but was considered a success for the North since it weakened American public support for the war. As a result the defeat on the battlefield, Giap adapted Dau Tranh to avoid concentration of forces and the effects of superior US firepower by transitioning back to Stage Two. The return to guerrilla operations ensured sustained US casualties and the continued erosion of public support between 1968 and 1971. At the same time, main force units that were decimated during Tet could withdrawal and reconstitute. (Pike, 229) .

             During this period another form of Dau Tranh was developed which called for a return to conventional operations. The revised strategy was tested in the 1972 Easter Offensive and the South Vietnamese again prevailed with aggressive fighting supported by US firepower. As a result of this setback, the communist leadership again reverted back to guerrilla operations to continue the fight while their conventional forces prepared to fight another day. The communists were eventually successful in defeating the Army of the Republic Vietnam (ARVN) in another conventional offensive in 1975 that led to the fall of the Saigon. (Pike, 229) .

             Although the communists suffered serious conventional defeats in 1968 and 1972, their ability to return to guerrilla operations reflected their adeptness at transitioning from one form of warfare to another.

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