Nevertheless, this presumption let to analysis regarding the asymmetric information where insufficient information on the second party threatens the efficiency of this sorting process. (Hendel and Lizzeri (1999)). Another focus on Henry Schneider's paper is to identify adverse selection effects. Using the Hendel and Lizzeri model, it predicts a negative impact on overall efficiency due to the appealing combination of affordable price and quality. Furthermore, after introducing in their model asymmetric information over vehicle quality on both parties, sellers and buyers, prediction of their model suggests that vehicles with more information asymmetry are more likely to have a faster depreciation in both price and quantity demanded and due to adverse selection, the number of high quality vehicles on trade is predicted to decrease. Statistics on adverse selection measured its impact which seems unimportant although there is a possibility of its presents. Hendel and Lizzeri's model predictions, that adverse selection is of secondary importance, seem to be validated in 2004 by Gilligan. .

             Pau Olivella and Marcos Vera-Hernaández's paper discusses the existence of adverse selection in health insurance markets. Their paper is focused in comparing the equilibrium set of individual choices under symmetric information with those under adverse selection. (Pau Olivella and Marcos Vera-Hernaández 2008). The authors perform a test of adverse selection in the UK including the predictions regarding the possible correlation between risk and the probability of taking private insurance under both symmetric information and adverse selection (Pau Olivella and Marcos Vera-Hernaández 2008). Although all individuals are publicly insured through the National Health Service (NHS), according to their theoretical model whether adverse selection is present or not gives the probability of requiring a private medical insurance (NHS and private insurance are substitutive).