According to author James M. McPherson (McPherson 306), although "estimates of the number of men who fought for the Confederacy are based on fragmentary" information, it is believed that somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000 men fought for the South, while it is "generally accepted" that some 2,100,000 troops fought for the North (McPherson 306).

             On the subject of military contrasts between the North and South, McPherson (316) explains that though the Confederate army instituted "ingenuity and innovations" in its naval strategies, the South's navy ".could never overcome Union supremacy on the high seas or along the coasts and rivers of the South" (McPherson 316). And though the South had to rely mainly on its land troops (Army), even in that theatre there were problems beyond mere manpower issues. There were attitude problems that led to the South's defeat.

             "In southern eyes the North was a nation of shopkeepers," McPherson writes on page 316. "It mattered not that the Union's industrial capacity was many times greater than the Confederacy's," McPherson continues. In fact, "southern boys" were "expecting a short and glorious war" (317), and they "rushed to join the colors before the fun was over," McPherson explains. .

             Another miscalculation on the part of the South that contributed to the South losing the war, according to author Potter was the fact that the Confederacy opted for a defensive strategy "rather than take any initiative against the North" (Potter 120). First, the South believed that the citizens up North were "so badly divided" that they would "not support a war of invasion against the South," Potter explains on page 120. There were solid reasons for the South to take a defensive position (it is "less costly" and "an army loses fewer troops defending a position" rather than attacking one, Potter continues on page 120).

             Still, notwithstanding the possible tactical advantages involved when taking a defensive position, Potter explains on page 122 that the South was, in fact, confining itself to "preventing the Union from winning," rather than going after the Union to defeat it.