In Plato's Republic, the philosophical question of justice arises between Socrates and Glaucon.1 Glaucon suggests three categories of justice and posits that justice is just a manmade convention that humans practice because it is to their advantage to do so. He and Socrates come to an agreement that that justice is both good in itself as well as for the good that comes out of it, included in the category in which "the man who is going to be blessed should like both for itself and for what comes out of it" (358a). However, they differ on whether justice produces happiness merely because it is inherently good or because it produces corollary benefits. Glaucon believes that people only practice justice when it serves them and produces consequences that they like; everyone would be just if justice benefited them, he feels, but if it didn't they would not act justly. Plato's own belief is that justice is more than just a human convention; it has an absolute reality of goodness of its own and should be pursued even if the consequences are not personally advantageous. The difference between these two views is characterized by a concomitant difference in vantage point; Glaucon sees the issue from the perspective of personal gain or loss, while Plato sees it from outside that realm in the sphere of absolute truths. Clearly, an absolute truth is more viable and defensible than a personal interest, and that is what this paper will prove: that justice is a higher order than personal advantage and as such must be adhered to regardless of the consequences to self, and further, that happiness is associated with acting justly whether one receives a reward for justice or not.

             The argument Glaucon raises against the absolutism of justice is exemplified in his story of the man who discovers a gold ring that allows him to become invisible. The man uses that power to commit adultery with the king's wife and "along with her, set upon the king and kill[ed] him.