6 billion in 1985 to $93.8 billion seven years later, with corrections' share of the total increasing from 28.6 percent to 33.6 percent, or $31.5 billion (Anderson 1997).

             Although many pundits discuss tough crime policies, it is difficult to find one that can provide statistical evidence that the policies work, beyond getting the politicians who favor them re-elected by a fearful public. .

             Anderson points out a study that assessed both the direct costs of crime to its victims, and also the "monetary value of lost quality of life" crime causes (Anderson 1997). The study used various measures to determine that an individual murder costs society $2.4 million each. Rapes cost society $60,000 each; arson rings in at abut $50,000 per incident, with a simple robbery costing $25,000, and assault the "low bidder" at only $22,000 each in costs to society (Anderson 1997).

             Despite these figures, there is abundant evidence that, regardless of whether the policies work, they are not cost-effective.

             Yglesias (2003) pointed out that while it would be wrong to contend that prison is never the right solution, or that there are no instances in which jail time would be effective, there are limits to their effectiveness built into human behavior. Yglesias quotes Richard Kern, a member of Virginia's Sentencing Commission, who notes that laws such as California's "three strikes and you're out" rule go "beyond the point of diminishing returns" for the simple reason that career criminals are not equally active for their entire lives. Robbery, for instances, is "a crime of the young" (Kern, quoted by Yglesias 2003). When the criminals are in their 20s, they are very active, but almost not active at all by the time they reach their 30s (Yglesias 2003). This suggests that there might be a better way, or maybe a cheaper way, to deter these criminals than expensively housing them with others from whom they can learn even better techniques with which to finish their careers.