.

             Specifically, arriving at the conclusion that one should drink could, almost uniformly, be backed by rational thought processes. The physical feeling of thirst might be interpreted as an indication from the body to the mind that water is needed; accordingly, the higher capacities of the mind are presented with a choice between heeding the very real needs of the body or ignoring them. If the conscious mind chooses to side with thirst, this is not clearly an irrational decision: the mind knows that indications of thirst are associated with the rational need for water. So, it is not that the feeling of thirst is irrational, but rather that the thirst mechanism within the human body is very simple-it is either on or off. Consequently, the desire to drink is driven by the limited nature of thirst; it is only concerned with the physical need for hydration, and not with the particular circumstances that might make drinking a good or bad decision for the conscious mind. Thirst cannot be attributed to irrationality because it is strongly connected to clearly positive and negative consequences, and the drive to drink is always aligned with the beneficial aspects of drink. Essentially, thirst can only appear irrational because the system within each human that chooses "thirst" or "not thirst" bases this decision entirely upon limited information. .

             Still, even this understanding of thirst must be at least somewhat flawed: I have divided aspects of the human mind and body to demonstrate how Plato"s theories fall short, but there is no obvious reason why they should be so plainly divided. Certainly, it may sometimes be helpful to model human inputs and decisions in such a way, but this by no means implies that such mechanisms-like thirst-are truly self-sufficient or independent of the mind. This introduces another central failing of Plato"s interpretation of the soul: in order to accept his organization of the soul, we must already accept the notion that the soul is something distinct from the body.