On July 13, 1998 the Managing Director of the International Monetary fund (IMF), Michael Camdessus said, "The IMF team currently in Moscow has reached an agreement with the Government of Russia on a major strengthening of Russian economic programs ("IMF Board"). In the agreement between the two, Russia was to receive a 22.6 billion-dollar bailout package to help their economic crisis. The Russian Government was to submit an economic plan to cope with the crisis, and show that it is being implemented. The IMF also stated that the "exchange rate Policy should remain unchanged during the remainder of the year" (Cohen). After four weeks, however, the ruble was devalued and reforms are not likely to be implemented. The Russian Government has failed to comply with the guidelines set by the IMF to receive full disbursement of the 22.6 billion dollars. The first installment of 4.8 billion dollars to Russia did nothing to bail out the mismanaged banking system, nor was it able to prevent the devolution of the ruble. The Russian Government has failed its people once again and the IMF should not provide additional aid to Russia (McKay A25).

             The IMF has been giving money and advice to Russia for over five years and they have yet to make any progress in creating a stable economy. In most cases there is .

             evidence that seems to indicate that much of the IMF aid has gone to bail out corrupt government officials, bureaucrats, and connected business men, while average Russians lost much of their bank deposits. Several Russian Government officials have been quoted as saying that they "swindled" the IMF into giving them more money and stalling on making economic reforms. This leads us to believe that the Russian Government has lied to the IMF and in doing so, hurting the Russian people. Reducing corruption is typically considered a key element in accelerating economic reform but when the leaders of the government are the ones stealing from the poor and paying the rich a serious overhaul is needed (McKay A25).